Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) is a hardware-based trusted execution environment (TEE) that enables secure computation without trusting any underlying software, such as operating system or even hardware firmware. It provides strong security guarantees, namely, confidentiality and integrity, to an enclave (i.e., a program running on Intel SGX) through solid hardware-based isolation. However, a new controlled-channel attack (Xu et al., Oakland 2015), although it is an out-of-scope attack according to Intel SGX's threat model, demonstrated that a malicious OS can infer coarse-grained control flows of an enclave via a series of page faults, and such a side-channel can be severe for security-sensitive applications.
Introduction
Establishing a trusted execution environment (TEE) is one of the most important security requirements, as we cannot fully trust the underlying computing platform, such as the public cloud and possibly compromised operating system (OS). When we want to run security-sensitive applications (e.g., processing financial or health data) in the public cloud, we need to either fully trust the operator, which is problematic [15] , or encrypt all data before uploading it to the cloud and perform computations directly on the encrypted data by using fully homomorphic encryption, which is too slow [43] , or property-preserving or searchable encryption, which is basically weak [39, 44, 16] . Even when we use the private cloud or personal workstation, similar problems still exist because we cannot ensure whether the underlying OS is robust against attacks due to its huge code base and high complexity [55, 27, 17, 36, 20, 2] . Since the OS is the trusted computing base (TCB), by compromising it, an attacker can have full control of any applications running on the platform.
Hardware-based TEEs, such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [57] , ARM TrustZone [4] , and Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) [23] , have been actively proposed to realize TEEs. Especially, Intel SGX is receiving a lot of attention because of its availability and applicability. All Intel Skylake and Kaby Lake CPUs support Intel SGX, and processes secured by Intel SGX (i.e., processes running inside an enclave) can use almost every unprivileged CPU instruction without restrictions. As far as we can trust the hardware vendors (i.e., if there is no hardware backdoor [63] ), it is believed that the hardware-based TEE is secure since compromising hardware is more difficult than software in most cases due to physical limitations (e.g., desoldering CPU packaging) and verifiability.
Unfortunately, recent studies [62, 52] show that Intel SGX suffers from a noise-free side-channel attack, known as a controlledchannel attack. Intel SGX allows an OS to have full control of the page table of an SGX program; it can map or unmap arbitrary memory pages of the SGX program. This makes a malicious OS know exactly which memory pages a victim SGX program attempts to access by monitoring page faults. Unlike conventional side channels such as cache-timing channels, this page-fault side channel is deterministic; namely, it does not suffer from any measurement noise.
The controlled-channel attack has a limitation; it only reveals coarse-grained page-level access patterns. Intel said that its architecture (including Intel SGX) aims to provide protection against side-channel attacks at the cache-line granularity [22] . Thus, such page-level access information would be too coarse grained to be their main concern. Further, researchers propose effective countermeasures against the controlled-channel attack, which are based on balanced execution [52] and user-space pagefault detection [51, 10, 52] . However, these countermeasures only prevent the controlled-channel attack, hence a fine-grained side-channel attack, if it exists, would easily bypass them.
We thoroughly explored Intel SGX to know whether it has a critical side channel that reveals fine-grained information (finer than cache-line granularity) and is robust against noise. One key observation is that Intel SGX leaves branch history uncleared during enclave mode switches, which can be used as a side channel. Knowing the branch history (i.e., taken or not-taken branches) is critical because it would reveal the fine-grained execution trace of a process in terms of basic blocks. To avoid this problem, Intel SGX hides the branch history information inside an enclave from hardware performance counters, including last branch record (LBR) and Intel Processor Trace (PT) [23] . In other words, an OS is unable to directly monitor and manipulate the branch history of enclave processes. However, since Intel SGX does not clear the branch history, the fine-grained execution traces can be potentially inferred outside of an enclave through a branch-prediction side channel [3, 12, 13] .
The branch-prediction side channel attack aims to recognize whether the history of a target branch instruction is stored into a CPU internal buffer for the branch prediction, known as the branch target buffer (BTB). To achieve the goal, this attack measures how long it takes to execute a shadowed branch instruction, which could be mapped into the same BTB entry the target branch instruction is stored into due to their same address in terms of lowest 31 bits ( §2.2) or set conflicts ( §6.2). This collision between two branch instructions results in a timing difference due to branch misprediction penalty ( §3). Several researchers have tried to use this side channel to infer cryptographic keys [3] , create a covert channel [12] , and break address space layout randomization (ASLR) [13] .
This attack, however, is difficult to realize without a compromised OS (i.e., the threat model of SGX) and a precise measurement strategy due to the following reasons. First, an attacker cannot easily guess the address of a target branch instruction and manipulates its branch addresses due to ASLR. Second, since the BTB's capacity is limited, its entry would be easily overwritten by other branch instructions before an attacker gets a chance to probe it. Third, measuring branch misprediction penalty suffers from tremendous time noise ( §3.3). In summary, an attacker should have 1) a right to freely manipulate the virtual address space, 2) access to the BTB anytime before it is overwritten, and 3) a method to recognize branch misprediction with negligible (or no) noise.
In this paper, we present a new branch-prediction side-channel attack, called the branch shadowing attack, to identify finegrained control flows inside an enclave without noise (to identify conditional and indirect branches) or with negligible noise (to identify unconditional branch). A malicious OS can easily manipulate the virtual address space of an enclave process, so that it is easy to create shadowed branch instructions colliding with target branch instructions in an enclave. To minimize the measurement noise, we tried to use Intel PT's timestamps instead of RDTSC ( §3.3). More importantly, we found that Sky-lake's LBR allows us to obtain the most accurate information for the branch shadowing attack because it reports whether each conditional/indirect branch instruction is correctly predicted or mispredicted. That is, we can exactly know the prediction and misprediction of conditional and indirect branches ( §3.3, §3.5). Furthermore, Skylake's LBR reports elapsed core cycles between LBR entry updates, which are very stable according to our measurements ( §3.3). By using this information, we can precisely infer the execution of an unconditional branch ( §3.4).
Precise execution control and frequent branch history probing are other important requirements of the branch shadowing attack. To achieve these goals, we manipulated the frequency of the local advanced programmable interrupt controller (APIC) timer as frequently as possible and modified the timer interrupt code to make it execute the branch shadowing attack. Further, we selectively disable the CPU cache when a more precise attack is needed ( §3.6).
We performed case studies to evaluate the effectiveness of the branch shadowing attack ( §4). First, we extracted sensitive information from SGX applications including Linux SGX SDK (string conversions and formatted strings), mbed TLS cryptographic library (RSA private keys), LIBSVM machine-learning library (classification models and parameters), and Apache web server (HTTP requests). Next, we analyzed state-of-the-art studies to secure SGX including deterministic multiplexing [52] , Sanctum [10] , SGX-Shield [49] , and T-SGX [51] , and confirmed that our attack bypassed all of them. Finally, we suggested hardware-and software-based countermeasures against the branch shadowing attack, by clearing branch history during enclave mode switches and using indirect branches with multiple targets ( §5). Both of them had acceptable overhead (below 1.3×).
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Fine-grained attack. We demonstrate that the branch shadowing attack can identify fine-grained control flow information inside an enclave in terms of basic blocks, unlike the state-of-the-art controlled-channel attack that only reveals page-level accesses. • Precise attack. We make the branch shadowing attack very precise by 1) exploiting Intel PT and LBR to correctly identify branch history and 2) adjusting the local APIC timer to precisely control the execution inside an enclave. We can deterministically know whether a target branch has taken or not taken without noise (conditional and indirect branches) or with negligible noise (unconditional branch). • Countermeasures. We design proof-of-concept hardwareand software-based countermeasures against the branch shadowing attack. We evaluate both approaches' effectiveness and performance overhead. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. §2 explains details about Intel SGX and other processor features our attack relies on. §3 introduces our branch shadowing attack in detail. §4 explains how the branch shadow attack reveals sensitive information from SGX applications and defeats recent security proposals. §5 describes our hardware-based and software-based mitigations against the branch shadowing attack. §6 discusses some limitations of the branch shadowing attack and considers possible advanced attacks. §7 introduces related work. §8 concludes this paper.
Background
In this section, we first explain the basics of Intel SGX. Then, we explain Intel CPU's other essential features (branch prediction, LBR, and local APIC timer) related with our attack.
Intel SGX
Intel SGX [9] is one of the existing implementations of hardwarebased TEE that has been shipped with Intel CPU since Skylake. SGX is designed under the assumption that the TCB is reduced to include only the internals of the CPU package, i.e., privileged software such as OS or hypervisor and other hardware units are excluded. To this end, SGX allows an application to instantiate a secure container called an enclave. Enclaves are allocated in a dedicated physical memory region, called the enclave page cache (EPC), that is protected by an on-chip memory encryption engine (MEE) such that the EPC content always stays encrypted and is only decrypted right before entering the CPU package. SGX also enforces different CPU access controls between enclave code and non-enclave code to allow only the enclave to access its own code and data, while accesses from other software are prohibited. Note that the enclave is still allowed to access non-enclave memory region. Enclaves can be created as part of applications' address space via an SGX instruction set. Measurement of code and data is calculated during the loading process and can serve as evidence about the enclave in remote attestation [28, 21] . Non-enclave cod and enclave code interaction. Non-enclave code can only switch to enclave code via either the EENTER instruction to a list of defined entry points or the ERESUME instruction that resumes execution where an asynchronous enclave exit (AEX) happens due to events such as exceptions and interrupts. Upon enclave exit (AEX or using the EEXIT instruction), a series of checks and actions is performed, such as TLB flush, to ensure the isolation of an enclave. To exchange input and output values, enclave code and non-enclave code use untrusted memory outside an enclave.
Branch Prediction
Branch prediction is one of the most important features of modern pipelined processors. Basically, an instruction pipeline consists of four major stages: fetch, decode, execute, and write-back. This pipeline structure makes the processor execute an instruction while fetching/decoding the next instructions and storing the result of the previous instruction into the memory (or the cache); namely, the processor can execute a number of instructions in parallel. However, the pipelined processor has a problem with a branch instruction because, before executing it, the processor cannot know what the next instruction is. Making the instruction pipeline stall until the processor confirms the next instruction is bad for the overall throughput, so modern processors have a branch prediction unit (BPU) to predict the next instruction after a branch instruction and execute it to maintain the pipeline utilization. However, a branch misprediction would bring a penalty because the processor needs to clear the pipeline and roll back the execution results. This is why the Intel optimization manual [24] emphasizes branches and Intel provides a dedicated hardware feature to log branch information: the LBR, which will be explained later. Branch and branch target prediction. There are two kinds of branch predictions: branch prediction and branch target prediction. Branch prediction is a procedure to predict the next instruction of a conditional branch by guessing whether it will be taken or not be taken. Branch target prediction is a procedure to predict the target instruction of a conditional or unconditional branch before executing it. For branch target prediction, modern processors have the branch target buffer (BTB) to store the computed target addresses of taken branch instructions and fetch them when the corresponding branch instructions are about to be executed. BTB structure and partial tag hit. The BTB resembles as cache. Some address bits are used to compute the index bits and some address bits are used for tag. However, in the BTB, only smaller number of bits are used for tag to save the BTB unlike cache uses the all the remaining bits for tag. For example, in 64 bit address space, if ADDR[11:0] are used for index, instead of using ADDR [63:12] for a tag, only partial number of bits such as ADDR [31:12] are used as tag. The reasons are first, compared to a data cache, the BTB size is very small, which results in many unused bits. Second, typically in one program, the upper bits are almost the same. Third, unlike a cache which needs to provide the architectural values, the BTB is just a predictor. Even if a partial tag matching results in a false BTB hit, the correct target will be computed at the execution stage and the pipeline will be roll back if the prediction is wrong. This feature is needed because for indirect branches, even a BTB hit can results in a wrong prediction, which should be corrected at the execution stage. Static and dynamic branch prediction. The static branch prediction is a basic rule of predicting the next instruction of a branch instruction when it has no history [24] . First, a processor predicts a conditional branch will not be taken, which means the next instruction will be directly fetched (i.e., a fall-through path). Second, a processor predicts an indirect branch will not be taken. Third, a processor predicts that an unconditional branch will be taken (i.e., the specified target will be fetched).
When a branch instruction has a history, i.e., it has a BTB entry, a processor predicts that the stored target address will be the next instruction. This procedure is known as dynamic branch prediction. Note that the changes of branch prediction behaviors according to the branch history can be used as a side channel to infer a victim process's activities ( §3).
Last Branch Record (LBR)
The LBR is Intel CPU's new feature that logs the information of recently taken branches without any performance degradation, as it is separated from the instruction pipeline [32, 31, 25] . In Skylake CPUs, the LBR stores the information of up to 32 recent branches, including the address of a branch instruction (from), the target address (to), whether the branch or branch target was mispredicted, and the elapsed core cycles between LBR entry updates (also known as the timed LBR). Without filtering, the LBR records all kinds of branches, including function calls, function returns, indirect branches, and conditional branches. Also, the LBR can selectively record branches taken in the user space, kernel space, or both.
Local APIC Timer
The local advanced programmable interrupt controller (APIC) is a component of Intel CPUs to configure and handle CPU-specific interrupts [25, §10] . An OS can program the local APIC through memory-mapped registers (e.g., device configuration register) or model-specific registers (MSRs) to adjust the frequency of the local APIC timer, which generates high-resolution timer interrupts, and deliver an interrupt to a CPU core (e.g., interprocessor interrupt (IPI) and I/O interrupt from the I/O APIC).
Intel CPUs support three local APIC timer modes: periodic, one-shot, and timestamp counter (TSC)-deadline modes. The periodic mode lets an OS configure the initial-count register whose value is copied into the current-count register the local APIC timer uses. The current-count register's value decreases at the rate of the bus frequency, and when it becomes zero, a timer interrupt is generated and the register is re-initialized by using the initial-count register. The one-shot mode lets an OS reconfigure the initial-count counter value whenever a timer interrupt is generated. The TSC-deadline mode is the most advanced and precise timer mode that allows an OS to specify when the next timer interrupt should occur in terms of a TSC value. Our target Linux system (kernel version 4.4) uses the TSC-deadline mode, so we mainly considers this mode.
Branch Shadowing Attacks
In this section, we explain our attack, the branch shadowing attack, to obtain the fine-grained control flow information of an enclave process. We first introduce our threat model and depict how we can attack three types of branches: conditional, unconditional, and indirect branches. Then, we describe our approach to synchronize the victim and attack code in terms of execution time and memory address space.
Threat Model
We explain our threat model, which is based on the original threat model of Intel SGX and the controlled-channel attack [62] : an attacker has compromised the operating system and exploits it to attack a target enclave program.
First, the attacker knows the possible control flows of a target enclave program (i.e., a sequence of branch instructions and their targets) by statically or dynamically analyzing its source code or binary. Unobservable code (e.g., self-modifying code and code from remote servers) is outside the scope of our attack. Also, the attacker can map the target enclave program into specific memory addresses to designate the locations of each branch instruction and its target address. Self-paging [19] and live rerandomization of address-space layout [14] inside an enclave are outside the scope of our attack.
Second, the attacker can infer which portion of code the target enclave program runs through observable events, such as calling functions outside an enclave and page faults. Our attack uses this information to synchronize the execution of the target enclave program with the branch probing code ( §3.8).
Third, the attacker can interrupt the execution of the target enclave program as frequently as possible to frequently run the branch probing code. This can be done by manipulating a local APIC timer and/or disabling the CPU cache ( §3.6).
Fourth, the attacker can recognize the branch probing code's branch prediction and misprediction by monitoring hardware performance counters (e.g., the LBR) or measuring branch misprediction penalty [3, 13, 12 ].
Overview
The goal of the branch shadowing attack is to obtain the finegrained control flow of an enclave program by 1) knowing whether a branch instruction has been taken or not taken and 2) inferring the target address of the taken branch. To achieve the goal, an attacker first needs to analyze the source code and/or binary of a victim enclave program to enumerate all branches (unconditional, conditional, and indirect branches) and their target addresses. Next, the attacker writes shadow codes for each branch or a set of branches to probe their branch history, which is similar to Evtyushkin et al.'s attack using the BTB [13] . Since using BTB alone suffers from significant noise, the branch shadowing uses both BTB and LBR, which allows the attacker precisely identify the states of all branch types ( §3.3, §3.4, §3.5). Due the size limitation of BTB and LBR, the branch shadowing attack has to synchronize the execution of the victim code and the shadow code in terms of execution time and memory address space. We manipulate the local APIC timer and the CPU cache ( §3.6) to frequently interrupt an enclave process's execution for synchronization, and adjust virtual address space ( §3.7) and run probing code to find a function an enclave process is running ( §3.8).
Conditional Branch Shadowing
We explain how an attacker can know whether a target conditional branch inside an enclave has been taken or not taken by shadowing its branch history. Unlike other branch types (unconditional and indirect branches) explained later, a conditional branch is related to two kinds of prediction: branch prediction and branch target prediction. For a conditional branch, we focus on recognizing whether the branch prediction is correct or not because it lets us know the result of the condition evaluation (i.e., a given condition of if statement or for loop). This goal differs from the previous branch timing attack against ASLR [13] because its goal is finding a randomized target address of a branch instruction by probing possible target addresses while monitoring the penalty of branch target mispredictions. Inferring through timing (RDTSC). We first explain how we can infer branch mispredictions with RDTSC, which is based on No Predicted (b) Case 2: The target conditional branch has not been taken (i.e., it has either not been executed or been executed but not taken.)
Figure 2:
Branch shadowing attack against a conditional branch (i.e., Case 1 for taken and Case 2 for non-taken branches) inside an enclave ( † LBR records the result of misprediction. For clarity, we use the result of prediction in this paper.)
(a) Victim if-else statement executed inside an enclave. According to the value of a, either ifblock or else-block is executed.
(b) Shadowed if-else statement aligned with (a) and executed after (a). The BPU predicts which block will be executed according to the branch history of (a). Figure 1 : An example of a shadowing scheme (b) against a victim's conditional branch (a). The execution time (i.e., running [1, [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] , marked with ⋆ in (b)) of the shadowing instance depends on the branching result (i.e., taken or not at [1] in (a)) of the victim instance.
Evtyushkin et al.'s approach [13] . Figure 1 shows example code with a conditional branch and its shadow for attack. The victim code's execution depends on the value of a: if a is not zero, the branch will not be taken such that the if-block will be executed; otherwise, the branch will be taken such that the else-block will be executed. In contrast, we make the shadow code's branch always be taken (i.e., the else-block is always executed). Without the branch history, this branch is always mispredicted due to the static branch prediction rule ( §2.2).
To exploit the branch history, we have to align the shadow code's address (both the branch instruction and its target address) with the victim code's address in terms of lower 31 bits, such that the shadow code can share the same BTB entries with the victim code.
When the victim code has been executed before the (aligned) shadow code is executed, the branch prediction or misprediction of the shadow code depends on the execution of the victim code. If the conditional branch of the victim code has been taken, i.e., if a was zero, the BPU predicts that the shadow code will also take the conditional branch, which is a correct prediction so that no rollback will happen. If the conditional branch of the victim code either has not been taken, i.e., if a was not zero, or has not been executed, the BPU predicts that the shadow code will not take the conditional branch. However, this is an incorrect prediction such that a rollback will happen.
Previous branch timing attacks try to measure such a rollback penalty by using RDTSC or RDTSCP instructions (e.g., before Line 1 and after Line 5 of Figure 1b ). However, according to our experiments (Table 1) , branch misprediction penalties were very noisy such that it was difficult to set a clear boundary between correct prediction and misprediction. This is because the number of instructions that would be mistakenly executed due to the branch misprediction is difficult to predict given the highly complicated internal structure of the latest Intel CPUs (e.g., outof-order execution). Therefore, we think that the RDTSC-based inference is difficult to use in practice and, thus, we aim to use the LBR to realize precise attacks, since it lets us know branch misprediction information and its elapsed cycle feature has a small noise (Table 1) .
Inferring from execution traces (Intel PT) . In addition to RDTSC, we found that Intel PT can be used to measure a misprediction penalty of a target branch, as it provides precise elapsed cycles (known as a CYC packet) between each PT packet. However, this CYC packets cannot be immediately used for our Precise leakages (LBR). Figure 2 shows a detailed procedure of conditional branch shadowing with the BTB and LBR. We first explain the case where a conditional branch has been taken (Case 1). 1 A conditional branch of the victim code inside an enclave is taken and the corresponding information (the branch instruction's address and the relative target address) is stored into the BTB. Note that this branch taken happens inside an enclave such that the LBR does not report this information unless we run an enclave process with a debug mode. 2 The enclave execution is interrupted and an OS takes control. We explain how a malicious OS can frequently interrupt an enclave process in §3.6. 3 The OS kernel enables the LBR and then executes the shadow code. 4 The BPU correctly predicts that the conditional branch will be taken. 5 Finally, by disabling and retrieving the LBR, we can know the shadow code's conditional branch has been correctly predicted. Note that, by default, the LBR reports that all the branches (including function calls) occurred in user and kernel spaces. Since our shadow code have no function calls and is executed in the kernel, we use the LBR's filtering mechanism to ignore every function call and all branches in the user space.
Next, we explain the case where a conditional branch has not been taken (Case 2). 1 The conditional branch of the victim code inside an enclave is not taken, so either no information is stored into the BTB or the corresponding old information is deleted (i.e., old information can be evicted if newer branches need to be inserted in the same set.) 2 The enclave execution is interrupted and an OS takes control. 3 The OS kernel enables the LBR and then executes the shadow code. 4 The BPU incorrectly predicts that the conditional branch will not been taken. 5 The execution is rolled back and the code takes the branch. 6 Finally, by disabling and retrieving the LBR, we can know that the shadow code's conditional branch has been mispredicted and can see the misprediction penalty.
Unconditional Branch Shadowing
We explain how an attacker can know whether a target unconditional branch inside an enclave has been executed or not by shadowing its branch history. The execution of an unconditional branch gives us two kinds of information. First, an attacker can infer where the instruction pointer (IP) inside an enclave currently points. Second, an attacker can infer the result of the condition evaluation of an if-else statement because an if block's last instruction is an unconditional branch to skip the corresponding else block.
Unlike a conditional branch, an unconditional branch is always taken when it is executed; i.e., a branch prediction is not needed. Thus, to recognize its behavior, we need to divert its target address to observe branch target mispredictions, not branch mispredictions. Interestingly, we found that the LBR does not report the branch target misprediction of an unconditional branch, unlike conditional and indirect branches. Thus, we use the elapsed cycles of a branch that the LBR reports to identify branch target misprediction penalty, which is less noisy than RDTSC (Table 1) . Attack procedure. Figure 3 shows a procedure of unconditional branch shadowing. Unlike the conditional branch shadowing, we make the target of the shadowed unconditional branch differ from the target of the victim unconditional branch inside an enclave to monitor a branch target misprediction of the shadowed branch. We first explain the case where an unconditional branch has been executed (Case 3). 1 An unconditional branch of the victim code inside an enclave is executed (i.e., taken) and the corresponding information is stored into the BTB. 2 The enclave execution is interrupted and OS takes control. 3 The OS kernel enables the LBR and then executes the shadow code. 4 The BPU mispredicts the branch target of the shadowed unconditional branch due to the mismatched branch history. 5 The execution is rolled back and the shadow code jumps into the correct target. 6 The shadow code executes an additional branch to measure the elapsed cycle of the mispredicted branch. 7 Finally, by disabling and retrieving the LBR, we infer that a branch target misprediction happened, according to the large elapsed cycles.
Next, we explain the case where an unconditional branch has not been taken (Case 4). 1 The enclave does not execute an unconditional branch of the victim code (e.g., a function containing the code is never executed), so the BTB does not have any information of the branch. 2 The enclave execution is interrupted and an OS takes control. 3 The OS kernel enables the LBR and then executes the shadow code. 4 The BPU correctly predicts the unconditional branch's target because no branch history exists. 5 The shadow code executes an additional branch to measure the elapsed cycles. 6 By disabling and retrieving the LBR, we infer that no branch target misprediction happened, according to the small elapsed cycles. No misprediction of unconditional branch. We found that the LBR always reports that every taken unconditional branch has been correctly predicted no matter whether a branch target misprediction has happened due to the BTB collision. Intel does not explain about this behavior, but we think that this is because the target of an unconditional branch is fixed such that it should not be mispredicted in general. The LBR is proposed for profiling branches and letting programmers know which branches are frequently mispredicted. With this information, they can improve the performance of their program by reorganizing branches to reduce mispredictions. In contrast, programmers have no way to handle mispredicted unconditional branches, which depend on the execution of kernel or another process simultaneously running in the same core due to hyperthreading; i.e., it does not help programmers improve their program and only reveals side-channel information. We believe these are the reasons the LBR just treats every unconditional branch as correctly predicted.
Indirect Branch Shadowing
We explain how we can know whether a target indirect branch inside an enclave has been executed by shadowing its branch history. Like an unconditional branch, an indirect branch is always taken when it is executed. However, unlike an unconditional branch, an indirect branch has no fixed branch target. If there is no history the BPU predicts that the right next instruction will be executed; this is the same as the indirect branch not being taken.
To recognize its behavior, we make a shadowed indirect branch target its next instruction to monitor a branch target misprediction due to the history. The LBR reports the mispredictions of indirect branches such that we do not need to rely on elapsed cycles to attack indirect branches.
Attack procedure. Figure 4 shows a detailed procedure of indirect branch shadowing. As mentioned previously, we set the target of the shadowed indirect branch target as its next instruction to observe whether a branch target misprediction happens or not due to the branch history. We first explain the case where an unconditional branch has been executed (Case 5). 1 An indirect branch of the victim code inside an enclave is executed (i.e., taken) and the corresponding information is stored into the BTB. 2 The enclave execution is interrupted and OS takes control. 3 The OS kernel enables the LBR and then executes the shadow code. 4 The BPU mispredicts the branch target of the shadowed indirect branch due to the mismatched branch history. 5 The execution is rolled back and the shadow code jumps into the correct target. 6 Finally, by disabling and retrieving the LBR, we can know that the shadow code's indirect branch has been incorrectly predicted. Next, we explain the case where an indirect branch has not been taken (Case 6). 1 The enclave does not execute the indirect branch of the victim code, so that the BTB does not have any information of the branch. 2 The enclave execution is interrupted and an OS takes control. 3 The OS kernel enables the LBR and then executes the shadow code. 4 The BPU correctly predicts the indirect branch's target because there is no branch history. 5 Finally, by disabling and retrieving the LBR, we can know that the shadow code's indirect branch has been correctly predicted, implying that the victim code's indirect branch has not been executed.
Inferring branch targets. Unlike conditional and unconditional branches, an indirect branch can have multiple targets such that just knowing whether it has been executed or not would be insufficient to know the victim code's execution. Since the indirect branch is mostly used for representing a switch-case statement, it is also related to a number of unconditional branches ❹ Predict branch (b) Case 6: The target indirect branch has not been taken (i.e., it has not been executed.) Elapsed Cycl.
Cond.
Taken -Not-taken --
Uncond.
Exec.
-Not-exec.
--
Indirect
-- Table 2 : Branch types and states the branch shadowing attack can infer by using the information of BTB and/or LBR.
(i.e., break) as an if-else statement does. This implies that an attacker can identify which case block has been executed by probing the corresponding unconditional branch. Also, if an attacker can repeatedly execute a victim enclave program with the same input, he or she can test the same indirect branch multiple times while changing candidate target addresses to eventually know the real target address by observing a correct branch target prediction. Table 2 summarizes the branch types and states our branch shadowing attack can infer and the necessary information.
Frequent Interrupt and Probe
The branch shadowing attack needs to consider cases that change (or even remove) BTB entries because they make the attack miss some branch histories. First, the size of the BTB is limited such that a BTB entry could be overwritten by another branch instruction. We empirically identified that the Skylake's BTB has 4,096 entries where the number of ways is four and the number of sets is 1,024 ( §5.1). Due to its well-designed index hashing algorithm, we observed that conflicts between two branch instructions located at different addresses rarely happened. But, no matter how, if more than 4,096 different branch instructions have been taken, the BTB will highly likely be overflowed and we lose some branch histories. Second, a BTB entry for a conditional or an indirect branch can be removed or changed due to a loop or re-execution of the same function. For example, a conditional branch has been taken at its first run and has not been taken at its second run due to the changes of the given condition, removing the corresponding BTB entry. A target of an indirect branch can also be changed according to conditions, which change the corresponding BTB entry. If the branch shadowing attack could not check a BTB entry before it has been changed, it will lose the information.
To overcome this challenge, we interrupt an enclave process as frequently as possible and check the branch history, by manipulating the local APIC timer and the CPU cache.
Manipulating local APIC timer.
We manipulate the frequency of the local APIC timer in a recent version of Linux that uses the TSC-deadline mode timer. Figure 5 shows how we modified the lapic_next_deadline() function specifying the next TSC deadline and the local_apic_timer_interrupt() function called whenever a timer interrupt is fired. We made and exported two global variables and function pointers to manipulate the behaviors of lapic_next_deadline() and local_apic_timer_interrupt() with a kernel module: lapic_next_deadline_delta to change the delta; lapic_target_cpu to specify a virtual CPU running a victim enclave process (via a CPU affinity); and timer_interrupt_hook to specify a function to be called whenever a timer interrupt is generated. In our evaluation environment having an Intel Core i7 6700K CPU (4GHz), we were able to have 1,000 as the minimum delta value; i.e., it fires a timer interrupt about every 1,000 cycles. Note that, in our environment, a delta value lower than 1,000 made the entire system freeze because a timer interrupt was generated before an old timer interrupt was handled by the interrupt handler.
We also counted how many CPU instructions can be executed between such frequent timer interrupts by running a loop with 1 /* linux-4.4.23/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c */ 2 ... 3 // manipualte the delta of TSC-deadline mode 4 unsigned int lapic_next_deadline_delta = 0U; 5 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lapic_next_deadline_delta); 6 7 // specify the virtual core under attack 8 int lapic_target_cpu = -1; 9 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lapic_target_cpu); Figure 5 : Modified local APIC timer code of Linux kernel 4.4.23. We changed lapic_next_deadline() to manipulate the next TSC deadline and local_apic_timer_interrupt() to launch the branch shadowing attack. We wrote a kernel module to change the exported global variables and function. an ADD instruction. On average, about 48.76 ADD instructions were executed between two timer interrupts (standard deviation: 2.75) 1 . This implies that, by using this frequent timer, we can apply the branch shadowing attack to a victim enclave process every 50th instructions. Disabling cache. If we want to attack a very short loop having branches (i.e., shorter than 50 instructions), the frequent timer interrupt would not be enough. To interrupt an enclave process more frequently, we selectively disable the L1 and L2 cache of a CPU core running the victim enclave process, by setting the cache disable (CD) bit of the CR0 control register through a kernel module. With the frequent timer interrupt and disabled cache, about 4.71 ADD instructions were executed between two timer interrupts on average (standard deviation: 1.96 with 10,000 iterations). This would be enough to attack most branches. One limitation of cache disabling is that it significantly slows the execution of a victim enclave process such that the process may notice it is under an attack. Therefore, an attacker needs to carefully disable the cache only for certain cases (e.g., when he or she recognizes a victim enclave process is executing a 1 /* isgx_ioctl.c */ 2 ... ... 20 } Figure 6 : Modified Intel SGX driver to manipulate the base address of an enclave function containing a very short loop).
Virtual Address Manipulation
To perform the branch shadowing attack, an attacker has to manipulate the virtual addresses of a victim enclave process. Since the attacker has already compromised an OS, manipulating the page table to change virtual addresses is an easy task. For simplicity, we assume the attacker disables the user-space ASLR and modifies the Intel SGX driver for Linux (vm_mmap) to change the base address of an enclave, as shown in Figure 6 . Also, the attacker puts an arbitrary number of NOP instructions before the shadow code to satisfy the alignment.
Attack Synchronization
Although the branch shadowing attack probes multiple branches in each iteration, it is insufficient when a victim enclave program is large. An approach to overcome this limitation is to apply the branch shadowing attack in a function level. Namely, an attacker first infers functions a victim enclave program either has executed or is currently executing and then probes branches belonging to the functions. If those functions contain entry points that can be invoked from outside (via the EENTER instruction) or rely on external calls, the attacker can correctly identify them because they are controllable and observable by the OS. However, the attacker needs another strategy to infer the execution of non-exported functions.
To find such executed functions, an attacker can create special shadow code consisting of always reachable branches of target functions (e.g., a conditional or unconditional branch located at the prologue). By periodically executing the special shadow code, the attacker can know which function has been executed and will run certain shadow code for the function.
Also, we can use the page-fault side channel [62] to synchronize attacks in terms of pages. Since this channel allows an attacker to know a code page that is about to be executed, he or she only needs to check functions located in the code page. But, this approach would not work when a victim enclave process is secured with recent studies [52, 10, 51] that prevent page-fault side channels.
Case Studies
In this section, we explain how we can use the branch shadowing to attack SGX applications and recent studies of securing SGX against the controlled-channel attack.
Attacking Enclave Applications
We explain how the branch shadowing attack infers fine-grained control-flow information of target SGX programs. Specifically, we focus on examples in which the controlled-channel attack cannot extract any information, e.g., control flows within a single page. Linux SGX SDK. We attacked two libc functions, strtol() and vfprint(), supported by Linux SGX SDK. Figure 7a is a simplified strtol() function that converts a string into an integer. By using the branch shadowing attack, we were able to infer the sign of an input number by checking the branches in Lines 10-15. Also, we could infer the length of an input number by checking the loop branch in Lines 18-27. In addition, when an input number was hexadecimal, we were able to use the branch at Line 20 to know whether each digit was larger than nine. Figure 7b is a simplified vfprintf() function used to print a formatted string. The branch shadowing attack was able to infer the format string by checking the switch-case statement in Lines 4-13 and the types of input arguments to this function according the switch-case statement in Lines 15-23. In contrast, the controlled-channel attack cannot infer this information because the functions called by vfprint(), including ADDSARG() and va_arg(), are inline functions. No page fault sequence will be observed. mbed TLS. mbed TLS is a lightweight implementation of TLS. We ported it to Intel SGX and tried to attack its RSA implementation, which was not supported by Intel SGX SDK. mbed TLS's RSA uses the Montgomery multiplication, as shown in Figure 8 , which has a dummy subtraction (Lines 24-27) to prevent the well-known remote timing attack [8] . The branch shadowing attack was able to detect the execution of this dummy branch. However, the controlled-channel cannot know whether a dummy subtraction has happened because both real and dummy branches execute the same function: mpi_sub_hlp(). LIBSVM. LIBSVM is a popular library supporting support vector machine (SVM) classifiers. We ported a classification logic of LIBSVM to Intel SGX because it would be a good example of machine learning as a service [40] while hiding the detailed parameters. Figure 9 shows the LIBSVM's kernel function code running inside an enclave. The branch shadowing attack can recognize the kernel type such as linear, polynomial, and radial basis function (RBF) due to the switch-case statement in Lines 4-28. Also, when a victim used an RBF kernel, we were able to infer the number of features (i.e., the length of a vector) he or she used (Lines 11-20). Apache. Apache is the most widely used web server. We ported Apache by decoupling the original Apache program such that some modules, such as the HTTP module, are secured by Intel SGX. Figure 10 shows a lookup function of Apache to parse the method of an HTTP request. Due to its switch-case statements, we can easily identify the method of a target HTTP request, such as GET, POST, DELETE, and PATCH. Since this function invokes either no function or memcmp(), the controlled-channel attack has no chance to identify the method. 
Attacking Side Channel Mitigations
In this section, we review recent studies [52, 10, 51] to secure Intel SGX against page-fault and/or cache-timing attacks, and explain how the branch shadowing attack can defeat them. We also discuss how we can use the branch shadowing attack to break an ASLR implementation in SGX [49] , though it is outside the scope of our threat model. channel, Shinde et al. [52] propose a deterministic multiplexing technique to make all page accesses oblivious. This technique is a weak form of the oblivious RAM (ORAM) technique [56, 34, 37, 46] , but much faster than when developerassisted compiler optimization is applied (at most 1.29× overhead). The deterministic multiplexing works as follows. First, it makes the execution tree of each function balanced by introducing dummy (or decoy) branches and basic blocks (Figure 11a ). This balanced execution tree is necessary to hide the behavior and execution time of a function because it can reveal which basic blocks of the function have been executed. Next, the deterministic multiplexing puts all real and dummy code blocks at the same execution level into the same code page and all data blocks that the code blocks will access into the same data page. This ensures that whether an enclave process is executing a real or dummy block, a page fault will occur at the same page. Thus, monitoring page fault sequences no longer reveals the control flows of a victim enclave process.
However, the branch shadowing attack can easily defeat the deterministic multiplexing technique because this attack can know whether a victim enclave process is executing a real or dummy block by using the branch history, not the page faults. That is, the selective execution of real or dummy branches according to condition evaluation cannot hide any secrets from the branch shadowing attack. One possible way to improve the deterministic multiplexing technique is to always to execute both real and dummy branches as Raccoon [46] does. However, it is difficult to use in practice due to huge performance overhead (21.8×). T-SGX. Shih et al. [51] propose T-SGX, which is a softwarebased technique to detect a page fault in user space by using an existing Intel CPU instruction: Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX). Intel TSX allows a user-level process to know whether a memory access generates a page fault or not before it is delivered to an OS. Therefore, with Intel TSX, an enclave process can detect suspicious page faults and terminate its execution, whose effects would be the same as proposals demanding hardware modifications [10, 52] .
T-SGX protects each basic block by individually wrapping it with Intel TSX and makes each of them jump to each other through a springboard page to enforce control flows (Figure 11b ). However, the branch shadowing attack can easily recognize which blocks have been executed by probing those branch instructions, implying that T-SGX cannot be used to detect or prevent the branch shadowing attack. SGX-Shield. Seo et al. [49] develop SGX-Shield, which is an enclave program to load the code consisting of randomization units (RUs) while randomizing their locations in place, i.e., it implements fine-grained ASLR (Figure 11c ). Since a malicious OS is no longer able to know the exact addresses of the target branch instructions due to randomization, it is difficult to directly apply the branch shadowing attack.
However, an attacker can infer the execution sequence of RUs because of the following limitations of SGX-Shield. First, SGX-Shield does not support live re-randomization such that the locations of all branch instructions are not changed during its execution. Second, the sizes of RUs are fixed (32 or 64 bytes) and their addresses are aligned to avoid any decoding errors. Since the last instruction of an RU is always a branch instruction to jump into the next RU, an attacker can identify whether it has been executed by testing the branch instruction. By repeating it against all RUs, the attacker will obtain the execution sequence eventually. Sanctum. Costan et al. [10] design a new hardware-based TEE, called Sanctum, which is a secured version of Intel SGX, built on top of the RISC-V [60, 59] Rocket Core. Sanctum's goals are detecting page-fault-based attacks and preventing cachetiming attacks. First, to detect page-fault-base attacks, Sanctum lets an enclave process know whether a page fault is occurring without the help of an OS (Shinde et al. [52] also mention a similar hardware design.) The enclave process then inspects whether the page fault is legitimate and terminates its execution when there is a security problem. Second, to prevent cachetiming attacks, Sanctum implements a page-coloring technique to partition the last-level cache (LLC). In Sanctum, physical addresses are shifted before being stored in the LLC, so that an OS cannot know the cache set storing its target memory page. However, since the branch shadowing attack neither generates any page faults nor relies on physical addresses, such countermeasures are irrelevant to this attack. Further, Sanctum aims to bring minimal modifications to the RISC-V Rocket Core, which also supports static and dynamic branch prediction. This implies that, by manipulating virtual addresses, we can perform branch shadowing attacks against the Sanctum's enclave unless Sanctum obfuscates branch prediction behaviors.
Countermeasures
In this section, we introduce our hardware-based and softwarebased countermeasures against the branch shadowing attack.
Hardware-based Countermeasure
The micro-architectural state of branch execution is maintained in two important structures: BTB and BPU. These are not necessarily monolithic structures, and they may be further divided into sub-structures depending on the implementation. For instance, the BTB may comprise of a different unit for indirect branches known as an iBTB. These structures are implemented per hardware core, and on systems that use Simultaneous Multi-Threading (SMT), they are generally shared between all the hardware threads of the core. On modern Intel processors with hyperthreading, we confirmed that the BTB state is shared between different SMT threads (hyperthreads) by creating set con- flicts in the BTB between two different hyper threads. To mitigate the class of security vulnerabilities described in this paper, we need to prevent two sources of information leakage: hyperthreads running in the same core; and the kernel and user code on the same hardware thread. Preventing leakage between hyperthreads is only possible if different hardware threads use different structures, or if hyperthreading is disabled ( §6.2). In order to prevent the leakage of information on the same hardware thread, we need to ensure that all branch related states are flushed whenever the context switches to or from enclave mode. Whenever an enclave context switch (via the EENTER, EEXIT, or ERESUME instruction or AEX) happens, we need to flush the BTB and BPU state. Since the BTB and BPU benefit from local and global branch execution history, there would be a performance penalty if these structures are flushed too frequently. We aim to determine the performance impact of flushing these structures at different frequencies in a cycle level out-of-order microarchitecture simulator, MacSim [30] . The details of our simulation parameters are listed in Table 3 . The BTB is modeled after the BTB in Intel Skylake processors. We used a method similar to [58, 1] to reverse engineer the BTB parameters. From our experiments, we found that the BTB is organized as a 4way set associative structure with a total of 4,096 entries. We model a simple branch predictor, gshare [38] , for the simulation. Current Intel processors use more advanced predictors, but the specifics are not very important for these experiments. We use 200 million instruction long traces from the SPEC06 benchmark suite for simulation and flush the BTB and BPU periodically at varying frequencies. Figure 12 shows the normalized instructions per cycle (IPC) for different flush frequencies. We found that if the flush frequency is higher than 100K cycles, it has a negligible impact on the performance. At a flush frequency of 100K cycles, the performance impact is lower than 2% and at 1 million cycles, it is negligible. Figure 13 shows the BTB hit rate, whereas Figure 14 shows the BPU correct, incorrect (direction prediction is wrong), and misfetch (target prediction is wrong) percentages. The BTB and BPU statistics are also virtually indistinguishable beyond a flush frequency of 100K cycles.
In a 4GHz CPU, if we assume that the interval between interrupts (or AEX) is 100K cycles, there would be 10,000 interrupts per second. According to our measurements, about 250 and 1,000 timer interrupts are generated per second in Linux (version 4.4) and Windows 10, respectively. Thus, if there is no I/O device generating too many interrupts, the flush frequency of 100K cycles would be reasonable.
Software-based Countermeasure
The hardware-based countermeasure can effectively prevent the branch shadowing attack, but we cannot be sure when and whether such hardware changes can be realized. Especially, if such changes cannot be done with micro code updates, Intel CPUs already deployed in the markets would have no countermeasure against the branch shadowing attack.
Possible software-based countermeasures against the branch shadowing attack are to remove branches [40] or to use the state-of-the-art ORAM technique, Raccoon [46] . Ohrimenko et al. [40] 's data-oblivious machine learning algorithms try to eliminate all branches by using a conditional move instruction, CMOV. However, their approach is algorithm-specific, i.e., we cannot apply it to general applications. Raccoon [46] always executes both paths of a conditional branch, such that it can hide whether the branch has been really taken from a branch shadowing attack. But, its performance overhead is high (21.8×). Zigzagger. We propose a practical, compiler-based mitigation scheme against the branch shadowing attack, called Zigzagger. The basic idea of Zigzagger is to obfuscate a set of branch instructions into a single indirect jump. However, it is not straightforward to compute the target block of each branch without relying on conditional jumps because conditional expressions would become very complex when we need to handle nested branches. In Zigzagger, we solved this problem by utilizing a CMOV instruction, which performs a conditional MOV operation, and introducing a sequence of non-conditional jump instructions in lieu of each branch. Zigzagger's approach has several bene- fits: 1) in terms of security, it provides a first line of protection on each branch blocks and explodes the potential flows in an enclave program; 2) in terms of performance, the unconditional jumps are much more favorable to instruction pipelining; 3) in terms of practicality, Zigzagger's transformation does not require complex analysis of code semantics (i.e., possible to implement it as a compiler pass). Furthermore, Zigzagger's execution pattern-back-and-forth jumps between the converted branch set and the Zigzagger's trampoline-practically increases the bar for de-obfuscating the fine-grained control-flow of the protected enclave problem. It is worth noting that this countermeasure is not specific to Intel SGX nor the branch shadowing attack proposed in this paper; we can use this approach to mitigate other types of branch-based timing attacks. Figure 15 shows how Zigzagger transforms an example code snippet having if, else-if, and else blocks. It converts all conditional and unconditional branches into unconditional branches targeting Zigzagger's trampoline that jumps back-and-forth with the converted branches and finally jumps into the real target address in a reserved register r15 stored before jumping into the Zigzagger. It reserves the register for performance reasons; for programs that can utilize more registers, it can potentially use the main memory instead, but reserving r15 in SGX has negligible performance overhead [51] . To emulate conditional execution without using conditional jump, we use CMOV instructions: e.g., the CMOV instructions in Figure 15b update r15 only when a or b is zero. Otherwise, these instructions are treated as NOP instructions. Since all of the unconditional branches are executed almost simultaneously in sequence, an attacker has difficulty recognizing the current instruction pointer; our APIC timer trick is not fine-grained enough to distinguish each branches in practice Implementation. We implemented Zigzagger in LLVM 4.0 as an LLVM pass that converts branches in each function and constructs the required trampoline. We also modified the LLVM backend to reserve the r15 register. We observed that when a function has many branches, making them share a single trampoline in Zigzagger introduces non-negligible performance overhead due to frequent jumps. To avoid this problem, our implementation provides a knob to configure the number of branches that each trampoline manages and randomly assigns branches to each trampoline. Note that such merging-based optimization trades the security for performance, but we believe it becomes more useful in practice (e.g., selectively applying to security-sensitive routines). Our proof-of-concept implementation of Zigzagger, which provides full protection, imposes 1.34× performance overheads, when evaluating it with the nbench benchmark suite (Table 4 ). With optimization (i.e., merging ≤ 3 branches into a single trampoline), the average overhead becomes less than 1.22×. Note that reserving a register in our microbenchmark results in 4%-50% performance improvement.
Discussion
In this section, we explain some limitations of the branch shadowing attack and discuss possible advanced attacks.
Limitations
An important limitation of the branch shadowing attack is that it cannot distinguish a not-taken conditional branch from a notexecuted conditional branch because, in both cases, the BTB has no information about the branch; the static branch prediction rule is applied. Also, the branch history attack cannot distinguish an indirect branch to the right next instruction from a not-executed indirect branch because their predicted branch targets are the same. Therefore, an attacker has to probe a number of correlated branches (e.g., unconditional branches in else-if or case blocks) to overcome this limitation.
Advanced Attacks
We introduce two advanced attacks based on the branch shadowing attack: hyperthreaded branch shadowing attack and blind branch shadowing attack. Hyperthreaded branch shadowing. Since two hyperthreads simultaneously running in the same physical core share the same BTB, a malicious hyperthread is able to attack a victim enclave hyperthread by using BTB entry conflicts, if a malicious OS gives the address information of the victim to it. We found that branch instructions with the same low 16-bit address were mapped into the same BTB set. Thus, a malicious hyperthread can monitor a BTB set for evictions by filling the BTB set with four branch instructions. The BTB clearing ( §5.1) cannot prevent this attack because no enclave mode switch happens. However, this attack cannot precisely identify the higher order bits of the victim branch's address yet since they aren't used in set index calculation. We plan to reverse engineer the BTB's characteristics in more detail to determine whether we can obtain the exact address of taken branches. Blind branch shadowing. A blind branch shadowing attack is an attempt to probe the entire or selected memory region of a victim enclave process to detect any unknown branch instructions. This attack would be necessary if a victim enclave process has self-modifying code or uses remote code loading, though it is outside the scope of our threat model ( §3.1). In the case of unconditional branches, blind probing is easy and effective because it does not need to infer target addresses. However, in the case of conditional and indirect branches, blind probing needs to consider branch instructions and their targets simultaneously such that the search space would be huge. We plan to consider an effective method to minimize the search space to know whether this attack is practical.
Related work
This section introduces studies related with our work including studies on SGX and microarchitectural side channels. Intel SGX. The strong security guarantee provided by SGX has drawn significant attention from the research community. Several security applications of SGX have been proposed, including secure data analysis [48, 40] , secure distributed computing [11, 7] , and secure networking service [50, 42] . Also, researchers implemented library OSes for SGX [6, 5] to run existing applications inside an enclave without any modifications. The security properties of SGX itself are also being intensively studied. For example, Sinha et al. [54, 53] develop tools to verify the confidentiality of enclave programs.
However, the authors of the above-mentioned projects do not consider the potential security attacks against SGX. Xu et al. [62] and Shinde et al. [52] demonstrate the first side-channel attack on SGX by leveraging the fact that SGX relies on OS for memory resource management. The attack is done by intentionally manipulating the page table to trigger a page fault and using a page fault sequence to infer the secret inside an enclave. Weichbrodt et al. [61] also show how a synchronous bug can be exploited to attack SGX applications.
To address the page-fault-based side-channel attack, Shinde et al. [52] have proposed an ORAM-like scheme that can effectively obfuscate the memory access pattern of the enclave program, but it suffers from significant performance overhead. Shih et al. [51] have proposed a compiler-based solution using Intel TSX to detect any suspicious page faults inside an enclave. Also, Costan et al. [10] have proposed a new enclave design to prevent both page-fault and cache-timing side channels. Finally, Seo et al. [49] have enforced fine-grained ASLR on enclave programs, which can raise the bar of exploiting any vulnerabilities and inferring control flow with page-fault sequences. However, we demonstrated that none of these solutions can mitigate the branch shadowing attack. Microarchitectural side channel. Numerous researchers have considered the security problems of microarchitectural side channels. The most popular and well-studied microarchitectural side channel is a CPU cache timing channel first developed by [33, 29, 41] to break cryptosystems. This attack is further extended to be conducted in the public cloud setting to recognize co-residency of virtual machines [47, 64] . Recently, several researchers further improved this attack to exploit the last level cache [26, 35] and realize a low-noise cache storage channel [18] . The CPU cache is not the sole source of the microarchitectural side channel. For example, Hund et al. [20] exploits the translation lookaside buffer (TLB) timing channel to break the kernel ASLR. Also, researchers improve this attack by exploiting other side channels in the Intel TSX [27] , a PREFETCH instruction [17] , and the BTB [13] , respectively. Note that Ge et al. [45] publish a comprehensive survey of microarchitectural side channels.
Conclusion
A hardware-based TEE is a promising technology to realize the truly secure public cloud, but, without serious security analysis, no one is willing to trust and use the TEE. Especially, a lack of thorough analysis of side channels is problematic because it is difficult to ensure that a TEE is completely free from any side channels. In this paper, we explored a new side-channel attack against Intel SGX, called a branch shadowing attack, which can precisely identify fine-grained (basic-block-level) control flows executed inside an enclave. We proposed a hardware-based countermeasure that clears the branch history during enclave mode switch and a software-based mitigation that makes branch executions oblivious.
